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Ironically, Charles Beard both reviled and revived The Federalists. Douglass 
Adair has shown that Federalist 10 was rarely cited in the 19th century, and 
argues that thus Beard made it more important than it really was. My question 
would be different: why did Federalist 10 disappear for so long when it was, in 
fact, crucial to the entire creation of the commercial republic?  But that is a 
question for another day. Beard was correct to make Federalist 10 important; he 
understood that economics were common and durable issues of faction to 
Madison. But Beard interpreted that essay through a sort of Marxist reductionist 
lens: know the economic holdings of the Framers and you know their ideas. 
Martin Diamond argued persuasively against Beard’s reductionist argument, but 
ended up saying that the Framers were insufficiently ancient and thus were solid 
but “low.” In the end, both Beard and Diamond agreed that America was ill-
founded for the very same reason: our founders created a commercial republic.   
 
I want to make the case for the Commercial Republic against a framework of 
distrust on bot sides of the spectrum. 
 
Federalist 51 provides the institutional or constitutional framework for the 
operation of Federalist 10.  There is nothing in The Federalist to encourage the 
direct will of the people ruling; they instead appeal to the deliberate sense of the 
community. That is what Madison means by the rule of law rather than the rule 
of men. The latter was seen as the very essence of tyranny. But for the 
Progressives the institutional framework was a mere façade for the rule of the 
upper over the lower class. The objective was to win the battle for democracy.  
Interestingly, on might have expected that Jefferson would have loomed large in 
the heroic figures of the Progressives. Wasn’t he the democrat par excellence of 
the Founding? He authored the Declaration of Independence and was absent for 
the creation of the Constitution. Yet, while Jefferson might have been a democrat, 
for Progressives, he had an under developed understanding of democracy. 
Namely, he put his emphasis on individual freedom and not social justice. Didn’t 
he oppose the upper class system being proposed by Hamilton?  Yes, but the 
Progressives think they can cure Hamiltonianism of upper classism and keep his 
nationalism. The solution is a national democracy. 
 
I am going to suggest that historians have misplaced the difference between 
Hamilton and Jefferson as the great divide in American politics.  One 
consequence is that we see the battle for America as agrarianism over against 
capitalism. This is another of the mistakes that historians make: import a 
European model to interpret America. 
 
Federalist 10 does say that the most common and durable source of faction is the 
property question. And that is what makes a conversation between the Founding 
and the Progressives possible. For Locke and Smith, private property is a 
legitimate reward for personal effort. It also leads to the improvement of the 
human condition. For Rousseau and Marx, private property is theft and the 
symbol of human alienation. Linked to the property question is what is the 
proper role of government? For Marx, all politics and government is about 
power. And power ultimately is economic power, which, in turn, is about the few 
who own and the many who don’t own property.   
 
There is thus a link to Lincoln and the Civil War and to the amended 
Constitution. The progressives play up the notion that the origin of real progress 
in America is constitutionalized by the 13th Amendment, which prohibits one 
human being to own another human being. At issue is whether or not that 
amendment is seen as a reversal of the ill-founded nation or as the fulfillment of 
a well-founded nation. Lincoln replaces both Jefferson and Hamilton as the 
Founders of modern America where human rights are more important than 
property rights. Thus, the Declaration becomes more important than the 
Constitution; if anything the Constitution is a reaction to the Declaration. 
 
But once you have passed the 13th and then the 14th and the 15th amendment 
what is there for you to do and what is the lesson for the next generation?   
 
Hamilton is a half-hero of the Progressives because they see him as a nationalist 
willing to use the power of the federal government. The economic theory of 
Beard is a mild form of class war and that social question is at the heart of the 
Progressive approach to politics.  It is class war stupid.  And certainly with the 
Progressives equality replaces liberty as the central concern of politics.  The role 
of the federal government is to regulate interstate commerce, thus the ICC and 
the emergence of the three new cabinet departments. 
 
So the Progressives are against the improved science of politics AND the 
extended commercial republic. Thus they think that America is ill founded.  They 
would rather have a parliamentary system governed by a centralized 
administration and a society that holds to the values of social justice or 
communal freedom than individual liberty, which seems to reinforce the selfish 
side of human nature. Competition implies market failure, whereas government 
intervention suggests government solution. And there is no sense saying that 
local government is better because, according to the Progressives, the great 
social problems do not recognize state boundaries. Thus, in addition to the 
separation of powers and checks and balances, the Progressives have no affinity 
for federalism.   
 
For Progressives, coordination rather than competition leads to good outcomes 
and leadership is linked to the notion of knowledge. There is a Progressive 
inkling that there is a body of knowledge that can be certified by an advanced 
degree somehow independent from special or personal interests.  These public 
servants will seek the common good, and since commerce and the common good 
do not go together, it is the job of government to reign in the self interested few 
who would shaft us unsuspecting and innocent many. 
 
 
John Locke and the Commercial Republic 
 
What joins commerce or trade on the one side with republic and law on the other 
side is the centrality of consent and contracts as normal parts of human living.  
People have been exchanging goods and services for centuries, but it is only 
when money replaces barter that money making becomes defensible and 
commerce emerges as a way of life.  Similarly, while the word republic has been 
around in the heads of philosophers and the statesmen of Rome for centuries, it 
is only when contrasted with monarchy that the word becomes clearer.  The 
attachment to public things inherent in the word republic is best understood in 
terms of its opposite, namely an attachment to private things. By the 17th 
century, republicanism was seen as the alternative to monarchy or absolute rule 
by one person for his or her own private interest.  The rallying cry for republics 
was that the rule of law should replace the rule of man. 
 
But it is not obvious that commerce and republic should be joined together.  
After all, the Peoples Republic, Socialist Republic, Islamic Republic, and 
Protestant Republic have all existed and they are all suspicious of the 
commercial way of life. And one can at least imagine widespread commercial 
activity taking place in 19th century Victorian England and 21st Century 
Communist China.  
 
 
We could begin our study of the commercial republic with Plato’s Republic and 
his remarks about a commercial regime being a city fit for pigs in contrast to the 
best regime run by philosophers rather than wage-earners.  We could then turn 
to Aristotle’s Politics, where we learn that the management of the household 
(oikos-nomos) is an inferior activity to the governing of the polis and that there 
are certain economic activities more in accordance with nature than others.  In 
particular, making money off of money is an unnatural act, whereas farming with 
an eye to self-sufficiency is praiseworthy. We could then work our way through 
Aquinas and beyond and discuss such concepts as the just price, the just wage, 
and further criticisms over the deadly sins that emerge from devoting too much 
attention to the life of the body and the secular world. Such a study would reveal 
two important points: 1) the case had to be made in favor of a commercial 
republic, and 2) there is something unsatisfying about the modern commercial 
republic regardless of whether that springs from attachment to ancient virtues 
or post-modern values.  
 
We begin our coverage of the commercial republic with the late 17th century 
work of John Locke. The dominant theme in Locke’s work is that improvement in 
the material condition of mankind is both possible and desirable.  With the help 
of the discoveries of modern science generally and of Rene Descartes, Isaac 
Newton, and Francis Bacon particularly, Locke presented a view of human 
progress and the transformation of nature that was unknown to the ancients.   
 
And Locke argued that this could best be achieved by challenging the existing 
mixed economic system of mercantilism and feudalism and the notion that 
monarchs had that divine right to rule and be obeyed absolutely, and by insisting 
that there should be a separation of church and state. 
 
 
 
Unlike the classicists and the post-moderns, Locke envisioned the essential unit 
of analysis to be the autonomous individual in a state of nature free from social 
restraints and governmental regulations. Locke portrayed this fundamental 
natural position of humans to be one of abject poverty. Nevertheless, since God 
gave the world to man to enjoy and improve rather than to simply suffer and 
starve, those who are rational and industrious in taking care of themselves by 
ploughing the land and investing in the useful arts and sciences are to be held in 
the highest esteem. Private property is the source of human improvement. True, 
God gave the world in to man common, but it is through the privatization of this 
property that the general wellbeing is advanced.   Accordingly, the acquisition of 
private property is natural rather than suspect (as the ancients would claim) or 
down right theft (as the post-moderns would challenge). 
 
But Locke didn’t stop with a defense of private property as 1) a legitimate 
reward for honest and productive labor and 2) an opportunity to invest the 
surplus product for personal profit.  He went beyond offering an alternative to 
the mercantilist theory of production of and the aristocratic distribution of 
property according to the law of primogeniture. He went beyond a defense of 
commerce broadly understood.  He actually challenged the traditional answer to 
the political question of who should rule. Locke seriously undermined not only 
primogeniture in the economic world but also the divine right of kings in the 
political world. Legitimate government came into existence by the consent of 
autonomous individuals who willingly surrendered the right to adjudicate 
disputes and reluctantly gave up the power to make laws that were necessary 
and proper for the well-being of the community. Locke brooks no idea that the 
rights of the people came from the government; rather the powers of the 
government were a limited grant by the people out of necessity.  All the better to 
separate the powers of government and limit the reach of government to 
specified objects with the people retaining control over the vast areas of their 
life.  
 
The critique of the Commercial Society suggests that the very term is an 
oxymoron.  How can a monetary economy based on exchange and investment for 
profit produce an outcome where the public good is served? Moreover, it rests 
on the assumption that competition actually exists in both spheres and produces 
a fair outcome. But experience proves that the economy does not work in this 
imaginary way, and thus a government can’t be limited to enforcing the rule of 
law against the theft of property and the abuse of power. The government, 
particularly a democratically inclined government, must control commerce so 
that it works on behalf of the people rather than advancing the interests of the 
few. The new case for government is not the classical claim of molding 
(re)public(an) virtue, but the claim that government is to secure the equal claim 
to happiness. 
 
 
Adam Smith and the American Founding 
 
Smith built on the Lockean foundation that the human condition was capable of 
improvement by individual initiative. Smith focused on improving the human 
condition by increasing the wealth of the nation. Poverty was to be solved by 
increasing production, which, in turn depended on the productivity of labor, 
which was strongly influenced by the division or specialization of labor, and that 
depended on the extent of the market.   
 
 But Smith made a correction to Locke that gave commerce an even greater 
moral support. Human beings not only have a natural inclination to self 
preservation and thus have the right to the means to self preservation; the 
butcher, the baker, and the brewer also have a natural inclination to “truck, 
barter, and exchange” beef, bread, and beer with other human beings.  No 
“human wisdom” was needed to create this situation; the “propensity “ to 
cooperate with others is a vital part of a commercial or civilized society.  In 
seeking the cooperation of others, however, we do not appeal to their generosity, 
“but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities  but of their 
advantages.  Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly upon the 
benevolence of his fellow-citizens.”   
 
In the Wealth of Nations, Smith presents his System of Natural Liberty where a 
commercial society if left to its own devices produces both improvement and 
equilibrium.  Smith wrote, contra Rousseau, that the practical arts and sciences 
actually lead to the improvement of society and that there is a natural progress 
from a primitive agricultural community to an advanced, or “civilized and 
thriving country.”    
 
In the final two books of the Wealth of Nations, Smith addresses the question of 
what government should do that is consistent with the Natural System of Liberty.  
He distinguishes between a Mercantile system of political economy, where the 
government is extensively involved in the day to day operations of production 
and the granting of special privileges to a few companies, and a commercial 
society where the government is limited to a few essential operations and the 
market operates in the area of production, distribution, and exchange.  This 
defense of an active market against an active government is what John Stuart 
Mill called the system of laissez faire in 1848 and what von Hayek called the 
system of free enterprise in the 20th century. The presumption through the 
centuries is that individuals know what is best for themselves and that the 
market system works favorably. The government should resist the urge to 
interfere against the contrary defense of government action which points to 
market failure as justification for involvement. 
 
There is a common thread that runs through the defense and critique of the 
commercial society. In many ways it turns on the role of human wisdom.  From 
Smith to Hayek and Friedman there is the suspicion that human wisdom is 
incapable of planning and anticipating what should be produced.  On the other 
hand, there is a strong presumption from the Mercantislists through the 
Progressives that selfless administrators can be educated to determine the level 
and kind of production necessary for an efficiently run economy. 
 
The other problem that needs to be considered is whether a commercial society 
promotes personal greed at the expense of a concern for the public welfare. How 
is it possible that a concern with self-interest in fact leads to desirable outcomes? 
How scientific is it to say that an invisible hand somehow works to unintended 
actions into favorable outcomes? This sounds like an economics of flashing 
mirrors. The defense from Locke through Smith to Hayek and Friedman is that a 
concern with self-interest is not the same as personal greed or self-indulgence.  A 
commercial society requires its habitants to learn the values of hard work, thrift, 
and moderation.  On the contrary says Smith “I have never known much good 
done by those who affected to trade for the public good.” To borrow from 
Tocqueville, the heavy hand of government involvement in the day-to-day lives 
of the people is likely to turn self-reliant citizens into obedient sheep or 
permanently dependent children. 
 
The Federalists followed the Smith model in its effort to control rather than 
eliminate faction.  The wellbeing of the nation depended on the presence of 
religious, political, and economic liberty.  These liberties in turn required the 
encouragement of a variety of opinions, passions, and interests, and these in turn 
depended greatly on the encouragement of a commercial society across an 
extended territory.  Commerce is not just tolerated; it is embraced. 
 
This leads us to emphasize what is critical in the origin and development of the 
commercial republic.  Commerce is deemed to be vital for the preservation of 
economic, political, and religious liberty.  At the heart of commerce is not only 
the idea of trade and exchange, but also competition.  It is through the 
competition of firms and industries for the support of the consumer that 
economic liberty is secured.  Similarly, the competition of the separate branches 
of government and different levels of government, augmented by frequent and 
fair elections helps secure political freedom.  And linked to this is the notion that 
religious liberty is strongly influence by the competition between a vast number 
and variety of religious sects for the support of the “religious consumer.”  
 
 
The American Founding and the Commercial Republic 
 
Perhaps the greatest contribution of The Federalist was that republicanism could 
be—in fact must be—operated on a scale not previously imagined.  The “oracle” 
Montesquieu, for example, argued that republics could only thrive in small and 
homogeneous communities where people knew each other and had a sufficient 
range of experiences in common to care for the public things.   To be sure, 
Montesquieu had supported federalism and the separation of powers, but he saw 
these republican institutions as auxiliaries to the social infrastructure of a small 
and homogeneous society where the inhabitants were involved as citizens and 
thus their public virtue was vital.  But such small communities were not 
conducive to the encouragement of a variety of interest.  The Federalist 
“corrected” Montesquieu by arguing that the republican institutions will work 
even better in a large republic than in a small one.  That is the whole point to 
Federalist 10 and 51. 
 
Madison put it this way in Federalist 51:  “If all men were angels, no government 
would be necessary.” We add, if all men were beasts, free government would be 
impossible. Thus free government presupposes a sufficient degree of virtue in 
the people that, when supported by institutional and economic competition, the 
republican principle of “the deliberate sense of the community” will prevail. 
There is no temptation in Madison to transform men into angels or to eliminate 
the causes of faction. 
 
We have said that the very idea of republicanism in the modern world is to 
replace the arbitrary distribution of economic and political power with a 
reasonable criteria, the evidence for truthfulness of which appears obvious to 
the reasonable person. The conventional law of primogeniture and monarchical 
rule were deemed to be self evidently false by the standard of nature. The rule of 
law is better than the rule of man. That is the key to the modern case for 
republicanism. One might add that the rule of markets –the law of demand and 
supply—is better than the rue of men in the economic realm. So it is not as 
unnatural as might first appear that commerce and republicanism belong 
together. A modern republic is designed to protect the rights of individuals and 
not just the rights of the few or the many. Modern republicanism does not stress 
the pre-existence and importance of a common good. Nor is it willing to rely 
simply on the voice of the people as the expression of a common good. Modern 
republicanism has a Constitution which species the powers of government, the 
rights of individuals, as well as the powers and limitations of the majority of the 
people. To be sure, this institutional arrangement receives its continued 
legitimacy from frequent and fair popular elections as well as the super 
majoritarian amendment process.   
 
Let’s take a look at the Constitutional support for a commercial republic.  And 
let’s look at the document more innocently than did Charles Beard did. Let’s take 
the language seriously.  And let’s ponder two central questions:  1) what does the 
Constitution have to say about republicanism? and 2) what is commercial about 
the Constitution and the republic it establishes? 
 
 It is far easier to answer the first question than the second and we need not 
delay too long to pursue the second question. According to the Framers, a 
republican form of government is where a) a scheme of representation takes 
place in contrast to both a monarch and a (pure) democracy; b) there is a 
separation of powers between the legislature and executive branches; c) the 
judicial branch is independent from the political branches; and d) the legislative 
branch is bicameral rather than unicameral. There is also e) a provision for 
frequent elections by the people, but there is room for debate about the mode of 
election, the length of term of office, whether terms of office should be staggered, 
and who can vote and who can run for office.  There is also f) provision for  the 
removal of a party from office. 
 
1). Article One, Section six indicates that “Senators and Representatives shall 
receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out 
of the Treasury of the United States.”  I think this underscores the commercial 
nature of the republic. As Ben Franklin reminded the delegates at the 
Philadelphia Convention, and political thinkers from Aristotle to Montesquieu 
argued, a republic required a deep attachment to public service by both the 
citizens and statesmen. The thought of paying someone to serve the public was 
certainly untraditional. But that is what the Framers proposed. Now, that did not 
mean that the electorate and the elected were to be motivated simply by money; 
rather it meant that it is appropriate to pay someone for services rendered and 
we can always refuse to hire them again by means of frequent elections.  Besides, 
paying a House member or senator for their service certainly broadens the pool 
of who can be elected. 
 
The Framers realized that paying the representatives could also lead to abuse.  
Thus in Article 2, Section 1, the President shall not receive a pay increase until 
after the next Presidential election.  This move was an attempt to check the 
potentiality for corruption in the executive branch. Similarly in Article 3, Section 
1, the judges shall be compensated for their services, but their pay shall not be 
reduced while in office. This is an attempt to secure the independence of the 
judiciary. 
 
2) Article 1, Section 7 that “all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the 
House of Representatives.” This clause is grounded in an American axiom of 
republican liberty: no taxation without representation.  
 
3) Among the 18 clauses Article One, Section 8 outlining the powers of Congress, 
there are at least six that deal directly with a commercial society.   
 
A) There was close to unanimous at the Constitutional Convention that 
Congressional action under the Articles of Confederation was impeded by the 
unavailability of a regular source of funding and borrowing.  Thus the delegates 
agreed to grant the power to tax and borrow to Congress under the new 
Constitution (see Article 1, section 8, clauses 1 and 2).  
 
But what if Congress abused this power?  One answer is that power is limited to 
public policy that supports the general welfare and common defense.  But what if 
these two clause are used as invitations to expand the role of government rather 
than to limit the role of government?  What policy can’t be justified in the name 
of the general welfare or common defense?  The Framers’ answer is that 
ultimately the people themselves initially through regular elections and 
ultimately through the amendment process must express their “deliberate 
sense” on the issue. Whether one interprets these clauses loosely or strictly has 
had a huge impact on the kind of commercial society and republican government 
that has unfolded in the United States. For example, the New Deal and Great 
Society programs in the 20th century and Obamacare in the 21st century owe 
much to a broad constitutional interpretation of these clauses. 
 
B) The most famous is Article 1, Section 8, clause three known popularly as the 
interstate commerce clause. The clause granting Congress the power to “regulate 
commerce…among the several states” is vital to the creation and preservation of 
an interstate commercial republic over an extended territory. But what exactly 
does this clause mean and has its meaning changed over time? Is it possible to 
draw a clear line between intrastate and interstate commerce as the Supreme 
Court in the new Deal era attempted to do?  What exactly constitutes commerce?  
Does Chief Justice John Marshall’s decision in McCulloch v Maryland settle the 
issue for good?  Again, the New Deal, the Great Society, and Obamacare programs 
relied on a very expansive rather than a restrictive interpretation of the meaning 
of this clause.   
 
The Progressives in the late 19th and early 20th century relied on this clause to 
regulate the relationship between capital and labor and support the 
development of labor union activity.  The Progressives also provided a 
significant challenge to the traditional understanding of the role of government 
in a commercial republic.  They introduced three new cabinet departments that 
were directly responsible for regulating the three sectors of the economy: the 
Agriculture Department, the Labor Department, and the Commerce Department.  
The roles of these departments have expanded over the last hundred years in an 
effort to control rather than encourage the operation of a commercially based 
republic. 
 
 
